Legal Standards by Bradway, John S.
LEGAL STANDARDS
LEGAL STANDARDS
JOHN S. BRADWAY*
The administration of justice, in a democracy, is, at once, a public
and a professional problem.1 The efficiency of the machinery and
the quality of the product are of more than passing interest to both
lawyers and laymen. Reforms, to be effective, should include tech-
nical and lay viewpoints.
The bar takes pride in the technical ability and high character of
its members.2 The record of that pride is found in proceedings of
bar association gatherings,3 reports of necrology committees, 4 legal
biographies,5 and descriptions of celebrated trials.6  The building
and maintenance of an honorable tradition is one of the professional
duties of every lawyer. 7 Unless each lawyer feels a continuing ob-
ligation to contribute to the prestige of the profession it can hardly
be kept at a high level. Disbarment as a penalty for one, who, in-
tentionally, or from inertia, fails conspicuously to bear a reasonable
share of the burden, might appear harsh; but such a policy would
help to discourage those who argue that the clever lawyer is the one
who reserves his time exclusively for his clients.8
The interest of the layman in the subject arises because, as client,
or as a member of the general public, he is the one for whose benefit
*Director of the Duke University Legal Aid Clinic.
**The writer desires to record his obligations to Mr. Harry Goldstein of
the Class of 1936 of the Duke University Law School for aid in the preparation
of the footnotes.
ISee "Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,"
No. 32. See also WILLOUGHBY, PRINcI.Es OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
(1929) 3.2See "Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,"
No. 29.
3BALDWIN, THE YOUNG MAN AND THE LAW (1920); Daugherty, Respect
for the Law (1921) 46 A. B. A. REP. 190, 191.
4See for example, Biography of Deceased Members (1935) 41 REP. OF
PA. BAi ASSOCIATION 283.5 CHAMBERS, SAMUEL SEABURY, A CHALLENGE (1932) ; HARRISON, CLARENCE
DARROW (1931).6 Dartmouth College Case, as reported in 1 WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923). See also "Boston Slave Riot and Trial of
Anthony Burns" (1854) ; "Trial of Laura D. Fair" (1871).7 See Preamble to "Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association"; also Canon 29.
Ssee for example, A Discussion of Criminal Justice in America (Jan. 5,
1935) THE LITE.RARY DIG;EST 9; Charles H. Tuttle, Society's Responsibility
for Crime (1934) 59 REP. A. B. A. 315, 320.
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the whole system was devised. He has, long ago, recognized that
the lawyer is essential." He does not have to be told that the ef-
ficiency and character of the lawyer are matters of primary impor-
tance. But in some respects his ideas are based on inadequate data.
The layman secures his information about the lawyer from per-
sonal contact as litigant, witness, or juror. As a participant he tends
to develop a subjective standard for evaluating the professional man,
in terms of the success or failure of his side of the particular case,
or because some personal characteristic of the lawyer appealed to
him. At second hand, the talk of his friends, folk sayings,' 0 classical
literature, 1 ' the motion picture,12 newspapers, 13 magazines, 14 and
critical contemporary books, 15 supply mental pictures which may or
may not be accurate, but which tend to persist and to color further
consideration of the subject.
Perhaps because of the difference in source material, it comes
about that, when one superimposes the professional picture of the
lawyer upon the lay picture of that same personage, the outlines do
not coincide. Which is correct? Probably neither. The lawyer
tends to start his thinking with, and therefore, to overemphasize as
typical the character of the great leaders of the profession; the lay-
man, on the other hand, is besought by newspapers and other media
to focus attention upon the more colorful personalities who appear,
often against the lurid background of some sensational case.'8 The
91 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 307.
lOBond, The Law and Lawyers in English Proverbs (Nov. 1935) 21 A.
B. A. J. 724.
1"See HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HIsTORIAN (1929).
12The detective, Philo Vance, in the series of mystery stories by S. S.
Van Dyne is in contrast to the district attorney, Markham. Perry Mason, in
the motion picture series represented by "The Case of the Howling Dog," and
"The Case of the Lucky Legs," goes about as near to the line of unethical
conduct as it is safe to do.
1SDuring the months of November and December, 1935, a press clipping
service revealed a total of over 100 statements derogatory to the legal pro-
fession. Among them were such headings as:
"Called in Trial of H, P won't talk. Alleged runner of lawyer accused
by bar committee refused to reply on grounds he might incriminate himself."
"Judge may refer Lawyer's tactics to bar association."
"Perjury in posting bond alleged against S."
"Court suspends Queens lawyer. N, ex county bar head, denies mis-
appropriation charge."
"Grievance committee asks disbarment of four lawyers."
14See Dawson, Frankenstein, Incorporated (March 1930) 19 AMERICAN
MERCUY 274; Beatty, Justice Cracks the Whip (June 1934) 117 AMERICAN
MAGAZINE 72; Flynn, Other People's Money (Oct. 30, 1935) 84 NEw REPUBLIC
MAGAZINE 333.
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extremes of the profession are not necessarily fair samples. The
great bulk of lawyers, perhaps because of innate conservatism and
fear of unethical publicity, are largely inarticulate. It would seem
timely for both lawyer and layman to give more attention to the
public service rendered by the profession in the light of present day
needs. The layman may be surprised at the quantity, the lawyer
at the dearth, of the contributions.
It is because the duty of the lawyer is broader than serving the
interests of the client that one is justified in an investigation which,
otherwise, might seem a graceless prying into the privacy of his
work and his character. Public criticism of the profession in recent
years has made an inquiry into the quality of legal work a matter
of public and professional concern. Proposals for public control
of the professions are not new. 17 But recently it has been urged
that the law be socialized, that lawyers be made purely public of-
ficials paid by and under the control of the state.' Replying to this
has come a solemn warning from the President of the American Bar
Association that, if the profession does not act, the public may. 19
There are many reasons why this profession should favor reforms
initiated by itself rather than forced upon it from without.
No intelligent action can be taken, let the crisis be never so acute,
unless the facts are available. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
compile a complete picture of the lawyer as he appears to the public
eye. But it is possible to study the nature and product of the pro-
fessional machinery by which the quality of the work of the bar and
the character of its members is tested. The inquiry may be further
delimited, within reasonable space, if one proposes specific questions
such as: How effective is the present machinery for determining
the quality of legal work and character of the bar? What justifiable
criticisms may be leveled against the present product of that
machinery? If specific faults can be segregated, listed, illustrated,
and brought out into the light of day, their seriousness and, perhaps,
the nature of a remedy may be calculated.
"
8 See, for example, GIsNET, A LAWYER TELLS Tx Tsrui (1931).
1 6 See the account of Darrow's Stirring defense of Loeb and Leopold.
HARmSON, CLARFNcE DARRow ('1931) 247-273.
17See 12 ENcYC. or Soc. ScIENcE, "Professions" 479.
18Laski, The Decline of the Professions (Nov. 1935) HARPER'S MAGAZINE676.
19 Ranson, Which Road for the Legal Ptofession? (1936) 22 A. B. A. J
21,23.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY TESTING
MACHINERY
There is a long and distinguished history of the efforts of the
bar, in the fields of legal education2 0 and admissions to the bar,2 1
to see that the stream which feeds the profession is filtered. Law
school instruction in legal ethics is subject to several criticisms,2 2 but
in other courses many student characteristics are evaluated. 23 More
is discovered by the bar examinations themselves. Those in charge
have an opportunity for evaluation of applicants, which, in compari-
son with the occasions afforded after admission, is admirable.
Standards are continually being raised. Elimination of those deemed
unfit is as important a part of the procedure as the training of the
rest.
The present problem arises after the applicant has passed the
threshold. Thereafter, short of disbarable activity, he is practically
free from supervision. The fact that he has passed examinations
is only prima facie evidence of his ability to assume the responsibilities
of law practice. The idea that, if left alone, he will surely gravitate
to the place at the bar best suited to his talents, assumes a public
able to evaluate professional ability, and willing to undertake an
uncompleted professional task. It overlooks the damage which the
inefficient lawyer does to the prestige of the profession. It is easier,
but hardly dignified, to shift the professional responsibility of clean-
ing its own house to the shoulders of the lay public. The client
properly objects to being used as an experimental guinea pig by
each new legal generation.
In addition to the sobering effect induced by individual dis-
satisfied clients and the general public, there are two pieces of
professional disciplinary machinery. The grievance committee2 4 and
20See the "Handbooks" of the Association of American Law Schools.
2 1See the various reports of the Section on Legal Education and Admission
to the Bar of the American Bar Association.
2 2See an address by Charles E. Clark, LAW PaOFESSOR, WHAT Now?
"Handbook" of the Association of American Law Schools 20, 21.
23For a criticism of the case method, see an address by R. T. Steffen,
The Content of :the Curriculum (April 1932) THE AMERIcAN LAW ScHOOl.
REv. 407.
24Sunderland, A Uxified and Self-Governing Bar (1933) 11 TENrT. L.
REV. 236; but see Turrentine, May the Bar Set Its Own House 'vs Order?
(1935) 34 MIcH. L. REv. 200 (an account of the emasculation of the State Bar
Act by the Supreme Court of California).
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the court,2 5 with its quadruple powers,2 6 are effective in their re-
spective spheres. Their limitations of inaccessibility, complexity of
machinery, and lack of fact finding devices are apparent.
Inaccessibility is a grave obstacle to certain groups of clients.
Perhaps the ones most in need of professional guidance are those
lacking ordinary self reliance, resourcefulness, courage, experience,
persistence. They do not know where, or have not the ability, to
make complaints. Traditionally, these are the widow and the orphan.
In practice they include many sections of the public. Legal Aid
societies meet many such.27 It is said that those in the economic
class above legal aid clients are similarly in need of special aid.28
The present machinery imposes upon such a layman a burden of
initiative, too often, beyond his capabilities. 29 If, for any reason,
he fails to do his part, the whole evaluation process breaks down.
If matters are not presented for determination the court and griev-
ance committee cannot function.
25Reed, ANNUAL REVIEw op LEGAL EDUCATION ('1930) 5; Cheadle, In-
herent Power of the Judiciary Over Admittance to the Bar (1932) 7 WASH.
L. REv. 320; Green, The Court's Power Over Admission and Disbarment (1925)
4 TEX. L. REv. 1, 17; Lee, Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission
to the Bar (1899) 13 HARv. L. REv. 233, 251.
26The powers of the court in this direction are usually described as: the
power of inquisition (People ex rel Karlin V. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E.
487 (1928)); the power to punish for contempt (Blodgett v. Superior Court,
290 Pac. 293 (Cal. 1930)) ; the power to disbar, suspend or censure (In re Peck,
88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914) the power to render summary judgment
Schell v. the Mayor, 27 N. E. 957 N. Y. App. 1891).
27The most satisfactory material with respect to this group of persons is
contained in the records of the legal aid societies of the United States. The
National Association of Legal Aid Organizations publishes annual figures as
to type of case received. The figures dealing with complaints against members
of the bar for the past ten years are as follows:
Number of cases
involving complaints
Year against lawyers
1924 976
1925 776
1926 765
1927 1,537
1928 1,240
1929 1,127
1930 1,628
1931 1,858
1932 1,633
1933 1,745
1934 1,7092 SMiller, The Difficulties of the Poor Man Accused of Crime, 124 THF.
ANNALS 63; Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes With What Results? ('1934) 39
COMMERCIAL L. J. 336; Weise, Why Not a Legal Clinic? (June 1935) 1 CoN-
SUMERS RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 8.2 9 0ne of the reasons for the popularity of administrative tribunals and
officials in contrast to the old court procedure is the greater aid given the
litigant.
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Complexity of machinery is an obstacle of a somewhat different
sort. The Grievance Committee, which views the problem solely as
a disciplinary matter, distinguishes, as a first step, between those
complaints which, to professional eyes, have merit, and those which
do not. The former receive attention; the latter are rejected. The
preparation of a complaint sufficient to move the committee neces-
sarily involves the preliminary collection, organization and weighing
of supporting information. Many clients do not possess the ex-
perience, training or ability to do such work. Others find it too
expensive or cumbersome to hire a second lawyer to prosecute the
first. If the defendant attorney keeps no records the task of the
aggrieved client may be difficult, if not impossible. Granting the
need for the grievance committee to maintain a quasi-judicial at-
titude, there is still a procedural gap to be bridged between the client
and his remedy.
If the bar were to view problems of this sort as a part of its
public relations field, the questions to be asked would be two: Has
the client any sort of grievance? Has the client a legally meritorious
grievance? Most cases involve the first and not the second question.
At present there is too little attention paid to the complainant after
it is decided the case has no legal merit. Yet such a client, doubly
rebuked, may become sullen with resentment or cociferous with
anger, outraged in his sense of propriety, bitter in his criticism.
The damage to the prestige of the profession from this source can-
not readily be measured, but it deserves to be considered as an
important factor. A remedy is called for. Some additional ma-
chinery is needed to explain the rejection of the case to the client
and, if possible, persuade him to accept cheerfully the opinion of
the committee. It would help the public to know more about these
legally unjustified complaints. The bar has done all too little in
educating the public to adopt legally satisfactory criteria in pro-
fessional matters.
The present machinery appears complex to the client because of
the preliminary burden thrown upon him. If the present day typical
grievance committee, itself, were to assume the task of detailed in-
vestigation, and explanation to the client, in every case which came
to its attention, the expense would be a material item.3 0 So the defect
is a continuing one.
3oThe American Bar Association expended the following sums in the
operation of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances: 1932,
$10,011; 1933, $7,193; 1934, $4,054. The cost of operation was far greater
than that of any other committee with the exception of the Executive Coin-
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The third obstacle is the absence of fact finding devices. The
bar should know with certainty as a background the nature and
extent of the whole field of law practice. It should know further
the nature and extent of the problems in the public relations field.
Some of these occur seldom and can be disposed of by the ordinary
disciplinary machinery. Others appear in groups. Special treat-
ment is necessary. At present these group problems are classifiable
under two heads. The client is the major victim in ambulance chas-
ing, misappropriation of client's funds, certain aspects of lay en-
croachment upon the practice of the law. The public, or the adverse
party, is.the victim where an unholy alliance exists between attorney
and client as in the fields of crime, 1 bankruptcy,3 2 divorce and
alimony. 33
At present until the unethical activity approaches a condition of
public scandal, information seldom is available for the disciplinary
groups. New machinery is needed, sensitive and comprehensive
enough to give an accurate picture. In the above respects the exist-
ing machinery is inadequate.
It may be argued that inaccessibility, complexity, and lack of
fact finding devices are, on the whole, beneficial; that it is poor
policy to encourage criticism of the bar; that if a person does not
take advantage of the existing machinery, it is a fair inference that
the complaint has little merit. Such argument does not take into
account the great differences between one client and the next. Even
if the machinery were simple enough for the average reasonable man,
the bar is faced too often with the unreasonable man. Because such
a person does not forget his grievance it would seem the part of
wisdom to keep his numbers down to an irreducible minimum. The
bar is not the only group which has to deal with him.
The value of special machinery to make it easy to prepare and
file complaints and provide patient, sympathetic, intelligent explana-
tions of rejected requests as a matter of course, has been recognized
mittee, and the Committee on Coordination of the Bar in 1934. See 57 A. B.
A. J. 340; 58 A. B. A. J. 308; 59 A. B. A. J. 381.
3iThe activities of a lawyer in touch with the criminal underworld are
described in FOWLER, THE GREAT MOUTHPIECE (1931).
32The bankruptcy racket as a means of defrauding honest creditors is
described in THE DONOVAN REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPT
ESTATEs (1930), especially Part I.
33The divorce racket is described in Bergeson, The Divorce Mill Adver-
tises (1935) 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 348.
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by business.3 4 Better Business Bureaus35 do much to maintain com-
mercial prestige by assuming the responsibility for investigating al-
leged improper practices. The layman cannot but notice a difference
if he compares the businessman's anxiety to see if anything is wrong
with the more conservative attitude of the grievance committee which,
as a matter of professional courtesy, waits until well authenticated
information is brought to it; which often meets in the private law
office of the chairman, a place difficult for the public to find even
if there is a notice on the office door; which has been trained to
indulge the presumption of innocence of the accused until guilt is
proven and assumes an attitude of quasi-judicial reserve lest it pre-
maturely and negligently ruin the reputation of a fellow attorney.
For lack of facts no one knows the nature and extent of the public
bias.3 6
The product of the disciplinary process-the data now collected
by courts and grievance committees-is also subject to criticism. The
reported cases deal largely with excess of zeal, energy, activity; too
little with inertia, slothfulness, incompetence. Too many purely pro-
fessional problems are, in practice, regarded as having an adequate
remedy if, under the law, the client may sue the lawyer for damages.
While general standards are clear their application to specific sets
of facts, perhaps because the facts are not always set forth in detail
in the opinion, leaves the reader of judicial opinions uncertain. Uni-
formity and predictability are lacking. Two examples must suffice-
legal courage and legal incompetence.
LEGAL COURAGE
The courts have had few occasions to pass upon the meaning of
the word "courage," 3 7 yet courage is a characteristic necessary at
all points of a lawyer's daily routine. It may be demonstrated in
the seclusion of his own office where he rejects unethical proposals
of clients, refuses, because of conscientious scruples, to handle cer-
tain cases, plans campaigns for his clients which may involve him
personally in public scorn or physical danger. It is present when
he puts his duty to the court, the profession and the public above
3 4See the various codes of business ethics. The standards of civic clubs
approximate Canons of Professional Ethics. These are epitomized in the
statement "The Customer is always right."
35See BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 21, 1931) at 18.
36McConnell, What We Laymen Think of You Lawyers, 1 GA. LAWYER
95; Beatty, Lawyers on the Loose Bar Needs Regulation, FORUM Vol. 13;
372-4.3 7 1n Gardner v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 19, 48 S. W. 170 (1898), distinguishing
legal courage from temper, the court says:
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his obligations to his client or himself. One must generalize about
the lawyer's courage in private because there is seldom any record
made.
Legal courage, exhibited in the public eye,3 8 is more readily
studied. But it is in court that the principal opportunities for meas-
urement occur. The lawyer who goes too far is guilty of contempt.
The limit of legal courage is marked roughly by the following types
of cases in which the court approved or did not disapprove action of
the lawyer:
1. Situations where counsel endeavors to show the disqualifi-
cation of a sitting judge. Where the ground alleged is the relation-
ship of the judge in the fourth degree to some person who has a
direct pecuniary interest in the suit, but is not a party to the record,3 9
alleging facts showing the bias or prejudice of the judge against the
client, provided such facts are material to the issues and state just
grounds for disqualification, even though they reflect on the in-
tegrity and good faith of the judge4o (but see the balance of the
opinion contra) alleging as a basis for disqualification past trans-
actions not involved in the pending case and an alleged intermeddling
by the judge in the domestic affairs of the client of a nature in-
dicating the hostility of the judge.4 1
2. Situations where counsel injects himself into the proceedings.
The filing and presentation of repeated motions which are thought
to be for the purpose of delay or vexation, but which are not pre-
sented in a contemptuous or disrespectful manner and which do not
"Courage means that quality of mind which enables one to encounter
dangers and difficulties with firmness, or without fear or depression of spirits;
valor, boldness, bravery, etc. A man may be a person of mild and agreeable
temper or disposition, capable of patience or forbearance with coolness under
great insults or provocation, and yet he may be a man of great courage or
vice versa."
38See the account of Lord Coke's controversy with King James I in his
effort to maintain the supremacy of the common law. LYoN AND BLOCK,
EDWARD COKE, ORACLE OF THE LAW (1929).
S9Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S. W. 143 (1908); cf. Bernstein v.
La Fetra, 171 App. Div. 269, 157 N. Y. S. 386 (1916). See In re Hanson,
99 Kan. 23, 160 Pac. 1141 (1916) (where counsel said, "This court has been
imposed on by counsel for defendant. This court has bitten so often on dope
and extrinsic matter put out by opposite party that they are getting bold in the
matter they put over." Quaere: Whether such ideas phrased in respectful
language should be grounds for disbarment.)
40Webb v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 391, 152 Pac. 957 (1915). See
In re Mains, 121 Mich. 603, 80 N. W. 714 (1899) ; Bar Ass'n of San Fran-
cisco v. Philbrook, 35 Cal. App. 460, 170 Pac. 440 (1917) (referred to judges
as criminal confederates).
411n re Cottingham, 66 Colo. 335, 182 P. 2d (1919) ; Also In re Rockmore,
127 App. Div. 449, 111 N. Y. S. 879 (1908) ; In re Dunn, 124 N. W. 120, 85
Neb. 606 (1909).
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
contain matter which, of itself, constitutes contempt;42 stating in
open court that he refuses to appear as counsel in a particular case
because he could not be treated fairly and that the court was unfair,
so long as the statements are neither contemptuous, defiant or
necessarily inconsistent with the candor and courtesy which should
characterize intercourse between bench and bar ;43 continuing to ask
questions of a witness after the court has ruled against him.4 4
3. Situations where counsel publishes, or, addressing an open
meeting, makes a criticism of the court in general: charging that
the judge was wholly unfit and incapacitated to hold court and that,
as a result, the court had broken down and ceased to function, pro-
vided the attorney disclaims intention to question the integrity of
the court and in the light of a statute defining contempt proceed-
ure;45 charging that a certain acquittal "was secured by a prosti-
tution of the machinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the
Republican party." 46
There are more cases on the other side of the fence determining
what action by the lawyer exceeds the limits of courage.
1. Situations where counsel endeavors to show the disqualifica-
tions of a sitting judge; requesting in open court a substitution be-
cause "the said justice has formed, and, upon a previous trial
expressed a most unqualified and decided opinion" contrary to the
client; 47 charging that the judge was "unduly active in prospective
litigation before this court."4 8
2. Situations where counsel injects himself into the proceed-
ings:
a. In open court-Persisting in arguing a point after the court
has announced that its ruling is final. 49
b. In briefs or motions-Maliciously charging a magistrate with
directing the constable to influence a juror against the client,50
charging that the court was influenced by corrupt motives in certain
rulings in pending cases,5 1 charging "They (counsel) have grown
42Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112S. W. 143 (1908).
4SHawes v. State, 46 Neb. 149, 64 N. W. 699 (1895).
44People v. La Fetra, 117 App. Div. 269, 157 N. Y. S. 386 (1916).
451n re Hickey, 149 Tenn. 344, 258 S. W. 417 (1924).
46Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 40 An. Rep. 637 ('1880).
47The Tweed contempt case. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER'S LIFE-
TIME (1914) 81-86.
4SWebb v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 391, 152 Pac. 957 (1915).
49People v. Newburger, 98 App. Div. 92, 90 N. Y. S. 740 (1904); In re
Mindes, 85 N. J. Law 117, 95 Atl. 743 (1915).50State v. Barnett, 98 S. C. 422, 82 S. E. 795 (1914).51People v. News Times Pub. Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912 (1906).
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to believe (perhaps erroneously as a general proposition) that courts
of equity recognize no limitations upon their powers, and that they
enjoy most the finding of new plausible ways for their distinction
of rights, however fortified by constitutions, statutes, or well
established principles, if once it has been made to see into them
personally desirable to accomplish that end ;52 charging "the court
(below) committed a colossal error in refusing to permit the
equitable project, if the condition of this company was such that
but sixty days thereafter, he (the vice chancellor) thought that this
company should be strangled and destroyed." 53
c. Writing letters to judges.-Charging that the judge's action
was "contrary to every principle of law governing injunctions" ;54
charging the judge with "outrageous, persistent, continued, illegal
and unlawful rulings," accepting bribes and co-operating with at-
torneys in a "diabolical plot" which was "a malicious, vindictive,
corrupt concoction" ;55 writing the judge, "it is our desire that no
such decisions or orders (as those made by the judge) shall stand
unreversed in any court we practice in" and commenting that the
ruling "is directly contrary to every principle of law governing in-
junctions, and everybody knows it, I believe";56 writing the judge a
threatening letter and giving the press a story of a proposed libel
suit against the judge ;57 writing the judge "if one tenth part of the
report of citizens of your district . . . be true, you are not only a
blockhead, but you are the most corrupt man, both on the bench and
off, that was ever elevated to judicial position."58
3. Situations where counsel publishes, or in open meeting, makes
a criticism of the court, stating "seats on the Supreme Court of this
state are a matter of barter, b-a-r-t-e-r, in plain words are bought
and sold," "who paid money, how much was paid and who got the
money at the election of the last supreme court judge ;"59 inciting
clients at a distance, who were parties to a suit to influence the action
of the court by intimidation applied to members by publications in
newspapers and printed circulars.60
4. Miscellaneous situations.
a. Against the judge.
52Casper v. Kalt-Zimmer Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 150 N. W. 1101 (1915).53In re Glaubenman, 107 N. J. Eq. 384, 152 AtI. 650 (1930).
541n re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72, 26 Am. Rep. 747 (1877).
551n re Mains, 121 Mich. 603, 80 N. W. 712 (1899).
56In re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72, 26 Am. Rep. 747 (1877).57 People v. Metzen, 291 Il1. 55, 125 N. E. 734 (1919).
58Jn re Rogers, 28 N. M. 375, 212 Pac. 1034 (1923).
591n re Troy, 43 R. I. 279, 111 Atl. 723 (1920).
6OEx parte Cole, 1 McCrary 405 (Fed. Cas. No. 2,973, 1879).
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Suing the judges-alleging that it was their duty to refrain from
"negligently, wrongfully, improperly, wilfully, wantonly, maliciously
and corruptly" making statements and findings without any legal
basis, but that in rendering their opinion they did so in violation of
their oaths of office ;61 threatening the judge, as he was descending
from the bench, with personal chastisement for alleged conduct dur-
ing the trial of a pending case. 62
b. Against lawyers and parties.
Repeatedly causing oppressive criminal actions and proceedings
to be begun against parties and attorneys opposed to the defendant
in civil litigation; repeatedly, with ulterior motives, making threats
of exposure and public disgrace against other attorneys ;6 threatening
opposing parties with criminal prosecution if payment is not made
in a civil proceeding;" 4 inviting the opposing party into the juris-
diction upon pretense of arranging a settlement, but in reality to
facilitate service of process upon him ;5 criticism of other lawyers. 66
Greater latitude is allowed where the lawyer is out of the physical
presence of the court and where the disagreement does not occur
regarding a pending case. Wherever orderly procedures are pro-
vided by statute or rule of court for securing a change of venue, a
new judge or a new ruling, the lawyer who creeps over the pro-
cedure is fairly safe. If the attack is upon the intelligence of the
judge rather than upon his honesty or integrity, it is less likely to
be corrected. Ordinarily a courteous, respectful demeanor will
favor the attorney. Four obligations bind a lawyer-to his client,
the court, the profession, and the community. It is natural that in
close cases, courts should give weight now to one, now to another.
Yet the result is absence of clear cut distinctions. The bar should
be interested in having the application of the law brought to a
greater degree of predictability than is observable in the two fol-
lowing examples:
1. Where counsel injects himself into the proceedings. In
Hawes v. State,43 the attorney "having, in open court, stated that
he refused to appear as counsel in the case of the State of Nebraska
v. W. M. and F. J., now pending in this court, that he would not
appear in this court, that he would not be treated fair and that this
61People v. Standidge, 333 Ill. 361, 164 N. E. 844 (1928).62Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335 (1871).
631n re Feinstein, 233 App. Div. 541, 253 N. Y. S. 455 (1931).641n re Gelman, 230 App. Div. 524, 245 N. Y. S. 416 (1930).
651n re Steinberg, 233 App. Div. 301, 252 N. Y. S. 755 (1931).661n re Eaton, 60 N. D. 580, 235 N. W. 587 (1931).
LEGAL STANDARDS
court was unfair, thereupon the said H - was by the court found
guilty of contempt of court." The appellate court, in reversing the
lower court, said, in part:
"But, to sustain a connection in such a case, it should
appear that the language or conduct imputed is per se con-
temptuous or innocent, according to the sense or manner in
which it is employed, the record should show it to have been
used in the culpable sense ... Referring again to the findings
of the court, we are impressed with the fact that the state-
ments imputed to the accused are, per se, neither contemptuous,
nor defiant nor necessarily inconsistent with the candor and
courtesy which should ever characterize intercourse between
the bench and bar. . . . A candid statement to the court or
judge, in respectful language, of the reasons for such a cause,
so far from being a contempt, is rather to be commended, as
tending to remove the cause for whatever differences may
exist between them, by reminding the court and counsel of
their reciprocal rights and duties."
In contrast with this is the case of In re S. 0. Pryor,5 4 in which
counsel wrote the judge a letter containing the sentence, "I can
hardly believe that such is the fact, for it is directly contrary to
every principle of law governing injunctions, and everybody knows
it, I believe." The court comments:
"Upon this we remark, in the first place, that the language
of this letter is very insulting. To say to a judge that a certain
ruling which he has made is 'contrary to every principle of
law, and that everybody knows it, is certainly a most severe
imputation.... To say to a judge that his ruling is contrary
to every principle of law, may be simply a reflection upon
his intelligence; but to couple with it an assertion that every-
body knows it, is clearly an imputation upon his integrity.
How can a judge be honest, and yet decide contrary to that
which he, as well as all others, knows to be the law?
"We remark, secondly, that an attorney is under special
obligations to be considerate and respectful in his conduct
and communications to a judge. .. "
In complaints against the administration of justice not related
to a specific pending case, greater leeway is allowed. Yet, even
here a difference of opinion in application of the rules is disclosed,
for example, in the two following cases: In Rhode Island, in the
case of In re Troy,59 an attorney in a public meeting made the
charge that seats on the Supreme Court were the subject of barter.
The court, finding him guilty of contempt, used the following lan-
guage:
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"The charge against the respondent is that of unprofes-
sional conduct. We are called upon to determine whether
his conduct has been such as to indicate that the license
granted to him has been unworthily exercised, and whether
he is fit to continue as a member of the bar and as an officer
of the courts of this state. Such unfitness would equally
be shown by proof of a false charge, maliciously made
against the integrity of the justices of either court. A
calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken
the authority of the court against whose members it was
made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its in-
fluence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's rights, and
interfere with the administration of justice. The cases are
numerous in which courts, having authority over admissions
to the bar and having the power of disbarment, have not
hesitated to discipline attorneys for false and unwarranted
attacks upon the integrity of inferior courts, and judicial
officers .... We find the respondent guilty of gross official
misconduct .... It is within the right of every citizen, whether
a member of the bar or not, to publicly advocate and by fair
and legitimate criticism and argument to urge changes in the
law with reference to any matter including the election of the
judiciary. . . . Because a man is a member of the bar, the
court will not under the guise of disciplinary proceedings,
deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
be possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts
of this state, in cases that have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism.
It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate
criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent
bar, as well as an independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights."
On the other side, in the Pennsylvania case, Ex parte Steinman,4 6
the lawyers, who were editors of a newspaper, printed a story about
a case charging that the acquittal "was secured by a prostitution of
the machinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the Republican
party," and added that as the judges belonged to that party it was
"unanimous - for once - that it need take no cognizance of the
imposition practiced upon it, and the disgrace attaching to it." The
court said:
"We may safely assume that it meant to charge, and did
charge, that the judge had decided the case wrongfully from
motives of political partisanship. We have no hesitation in
pronouncing such a publication to be a gross libel on its face.
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Nothing can be more disgraceful-not even perhaps that of
direct bribery-than such an imputation on the motives of
judges in the administration of justice. . . Whether a libel
is an offense of such a character (as to show that the at-
torney was not fit to associate with honest men) may be a
question, but certain it is that if the libel in this case had
been upon a private individual, upon a public officer, such
even as the district attorney, the court could not (under the
statutes) have summarily convicted the defendants and dis-
barred them. . . . But the graveness of the offense of the
complainants was that the publication was a libel on the court
of which they were attorneys, and this, it is earnestly con-
tended, was 'misbehavior in their office' which gave the court
power to exercise summary jurisdiction by removing them.
(The court then refers to a change in the law.) We need not
say that the case is altered and that it is now the right and
the duty of a lawyer to bring to the notice of the people who
elect the judges every instance of what he believes to be
corruption or partisanship. No class of the community ought
to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges
than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities
of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who
are called on to vote never enter a courthouse, or if they do,
it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To
say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject
under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom
he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position
too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our
present system."
In these two examples the courts, in determining whether or not
to discipline the lawyers, disagree upon what are, in a measure,
similar sets of facts and cite in support of their actions conflicting
duties. The obligations of the lawyer toL his client and to the court
in one case; to the court and to the public in the other, cannot be
evaded. Yet the conscientious practitioner, through lack of predic-
tability, faces a real dilemma.
LEGAL INCOMPETENCE
One would expect to contrast cowardice67 with courage. This is
impossible, because search has failed to reveal cases involving con-
67Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines cowardice as misbehavior through
fear in relation to some duty to perform before an enemy, citing U. S. Rev.
Stat. §§ 1342 and 1624.
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duct to which the term cowardice can accurately be affixed. A
broad definition would include scurrilous attacks68 upon the court
or its officers where there are no facts justifying such action and
where the lawyer, having exhausted his logic, is attempting to brow-
beat or threaten the judge.
Aside from authorities, it seems that cowardice, in a very real
sense, may affect the conduct of an attorney. A lawyer who agrees
to a settlement because he is frightened by the prestige of his op-
ponent; or who refuses to take into court a case, which should. be
litigated, because he recognizes his own inability in dealing with
litigation procedure, but will not acknowledge it by associating with
him a more experienced practitioner, may be guilty of cowardice.
The nearest approach of judicial decisions to the subject is the slim
list of cases in which legal incompetence 6 9 has been made the basis
for disciplinary action. It is interesting to note that in many of
them the action of the court is based upon several factors such as
fraud, dishonesty and one cannot tell how for incompetence alone
would have affected the situation. It might almost be said that
legal incompetence is not a basis for disciplinary action. This is
bad enough but there is a further evidence of indifference.
The bar has indicated its willingness to shift the responsibility
for the maintenance of reasonable standards of professional com-
petency to the shoulders of the lay public. There are many cases
where a client in a civil action has recovered damages from a lawyer
for negligence. 7o But after the recovery which has judicially de-
termined the attorney's fault, there seems to be no case in which
professional concern has been severe enough to bring about a dis-
ciplinary action.
68See notes 54 to 58, supra.69Bryant's case, 24 N. H. 149 (1851) (Incompetence no basis for disbar-
ment on ground that statute imposed no requirement as to the knowledge of
law), Smith v. State, 14 N. Y. 228 (1829) (By dictum, court may withdraw
license because of attorney's loss of learning or mental capacity). See also
People ex tel Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Charme, 288 Ill. 220, 123 N. E. 291 (1919)
(No disbarment because of lack of diligence or good judgment) ; Also In re
Boland, 140 Wash. 148, 248 Pac. 399 (1926) (An attorney can not be disbarred
or suspended for a single act of negligence not amounting to gross incompe-
tency); People ex tel Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Wing, 284 Ill. 647, 120 N. E.
451 (1918) ; Gould v. State of Fla. 127 So. 309 (1930) ; ("It would be a severe
remedy to disbar an attorney for carelessness, inattention to duty, ignorance of
his client's rights, and the remedies to enforce them, or even for an occasional
equivocation in an effort to appear better informed and more alert than his
client suspects . . .). Inattention to duty accompanied by deceit or imposition
has been held ground for disbarment or suspension. See 69 A. L. R. 707.
70The writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Russell L. Hiller,
a student at Duke University School of Law, for material collected for the
course of Legal Ethics, 1935-36 in a paper entitled "The Civil Liability of an
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A SUGGESTED REMEDY
The foregoing review of cases indicates that, while there is legal
machinery for listing quality and character, it does not cover the
field nor is its product adequate to supply the basis for a code of
standards. It is not clear on the facts how far a lawyer may go
in discharging his obligation to a client without coming in conflict
with his duty to the court. His dilemma presents the justification
for remedial machinery and a more specific set of standards in-
dicating the maximum and the minimum limits of his activity.
Granting the need for flexibility, reasonable leeway, consideration
of every case on its own merits, and all the other customary quali-
fications of a new proposal, those who agree that a dissatisfied
client is a menace to professional prestige, may admit the need for
a remedy in two directions:
1. A fact gathering agency to provide a basis for measuring
the quality of legal work.
2. A code containing provisions more specific, more detailed,
more nearly related to the daily work of the lawyer.
Both of these suggestions deserve further consideration.
The fact gathering agency should include two elements-a system
of uniform record keeping in the individual law office, and a central
agency for receiving information.
THE SYSTEM IN THE LAW OFFICE
Most law offices have adopted systems for recording the facts
and progress of each case. Heretofore that data has been used to
only a slight extent beyond the four walls. Legal aid societies
have developed the healthy habit of using their records for many
Attorney to his Client for Negligence, Mis-management and Incompetence."
The following references are taken from that paper:
The attorney is liable in money damages to his client for want of such
skill, care and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess in
such matters of professional employment. In some limited instances the court
will allow the client a new trial because of the lawyer's incompetence, 24
A. L. R. 1025. He is liable for loss to his client resulting from ignorance of
settled rules of law and of practice (Krumboli v. Kinkel, 123 N. E. 205
(N. Y. App. 1919) ; Enterline v. Miller, 27 Pa. Super, 463; Goodman v. Walker,
30. Ala. 482); for loss resulting from poorly drawn documents, 43 A. L. R.
932; for loss resulting from negligence in title examination work (Watson v..
Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868); Lowell v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532; Savings Bank
v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1879); 5 A. L. R. 1585 from faulty office system.
In re Blatt, 246 N. Y. S. 77 (1930). See in general 5 A. L. R. 1385-9; 7
L. R. A. 669: 24 A. L. R. 1025-41; 43 A. L. R. 932; 47 A. L. R. 267-69; 69
A. L. R. 705-9.
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purposes, such as a basis for remedial legislation.71  Physicians
have learned that the records of their patients' progress are of value
in the public health field, in preventive medicine, in recording the
progress of certain remedies.72
The first step in securing the facts is to require, by common
consent, bar association edict, rule of court or statute, that all law
offices keep certain minimum records regarding their cases and
clients. No elaborate system is desirable. A simple card for each
case might contain the names of parties and witnesses, the nature
of the case, and a dated chronological listing of what was done.
If one wished more, a filing system and a follow up system might
be added.
The practice of keeping this data would act as an incentive to
the individual lawyer to maintain a high standard of effectiveness.
It would provide a most effective defense to unmerited criticism
and would give the Grievance Committee an impersonal summary
of facts if a client wants to complain. There should be only three
occasions, and then only in response to a court order, when anything
more than the statistical information might be brought to light:
(a) in the interest of the client, (b) in the interest of the attorney,
(c) in the interest of the public when circumstances indicated the
existence of an unholy alliance between attorney and client. Thus
there would be no conflict with the rules providing for confidential
inviolability of facts given in the attorney-client relationship. 73  If
the report indicated that in X county there were ten instances of
ambulance chasing this year, as against fifteen occasions last year,
the record would be highly impersonal. The fact that yellow fever
had declined during a certain period in no way violates the con-
fidential relation of physician and patient. Yet, if the facts are
required to be kept by the lawyer they may be secured under proper
71lRecords of legal aid societies have been a significant factor in convinc-
ing legislatures that the uniform small loans law was a practical method of
combatting the loan shark; other legal aid activities looking toward legislation
are in the fields of court costs and the collection of wage claims. See "Report
of Legal Aid Committee of American Bar Association," 1924, p. 386; 1925,
p. 456; 1927, p. 324.
72N. Y. CoNsoL LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 46, § 320 (reports of tuberculosis
by physicians); c. 46, § 25 (duty to report contagious disease). N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1935)§ 7192 (physicians to report cases of venereal diseases
to health authorities) ; Ill. REV. STAT. ANN. (Smith--Hurd, 1933) c. 91, § 106.
See statistical studies of health and medical care, CARTER, STATISTICS IN SOCIAL
STuDrs (1930) at 31.
73The attorney's privilege against disclosure of confidential communica-
tions would obviously not be violated by such an index. See 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2290 et seq. for a complete account of the privilege.
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circumstances. It appears that this device will supply the basic raw
material.
THE FACT GATHERING AGENCY
The fact that the information is in the lawyer's office is not a
complete solution of the problem. A central depository for facts
about law practice containing an impersonal index would seem es-
sential.
The suggested machinery would be simple and inexpensive in
operation. It would be, in effect, an office for the collection of
legal vital statistics, organized and operated like the existing bureaus
which gather data more closely related to the field of the medical
profession. A room, a filing system, clerks, a statistical procedure,
and periodic reports would cover the essentials. Funds for it might
be secured from the public treasury, the bar, commercial agencies,
or from private foundations. Supervision and control should be
exercised by the county bar association. An office might be located
in each county or group of counties. The clerk of the court might
assume the duties if the enterprise became a public agency.
To it reports covering the functioning of the entire machinery
for administering justice should be made. In the present instance
only those reports relating to standards of work of lawyers need be
noticed. The idea of a ministry of justice is not new. 74
The form of such a report should be kept as simple as possible.J
5
Each law office should report, upon the conclusion of each piece of
legal business, the following: a symbol representing the client; a
symbol representing the lawyer, the nature of the matter, the results.
Each client should report upon the conclusion of each piece of legal
business the following: the client's name, the lawyer's name, the
nature of the matter, the client's evaluation of the lawyer's work,
as either "better than satisfactory," "satisfactory," "not satisfac-
tory"; if the work is not satisfactory, reasons should be given.
Opposing counsel and other parties, witnesses, and interested
persons might make reports similar to the clients.
Each judge before whom counsel appeared might report his
opinion of the quality of the work giving the name of the proceed-
U4See Acheson, A Minister of Justice (1933) 31 THE LEGAL Am REv.
8; Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 H~av. L. REV. 113; Bacon, On
A Ministry of Justice (1935) 22 VA. LAw Rav. 175.
75For a description of an attempt to develop a device for measuring the
efficiency of work of family case work agencies, see Hurlin, Statistical Studies
of Dependencies (1931) STAns ics ru SOCIAL ScINcs 43.
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ing, the. name of counsel and grading the work as "more than sat-
isfactory," "satisfactory," or "not satisfactory." Perhaps it would
be easier to obtain a blanket report indicating that out of a certain
number of lawyers appearing before a judge during the period so
many were above average, so many average, and so many below
average.
Such opinions are now formed. The only new factor would be
the recording. Allowing for the personal considerations which might
affect the accuracy and judgment of the recorders, the lack of
courage in expressing on paper evaluations of one's fellows, the
plan will provide certain material not now available, to grant immunity
to action for libel to recorders might be a wise precaution.
The material thus gathered would be available for several pur-
poses. Those lawyers against whom complaints of undue serious-
ness or volume were filed would stand out from among their fellows.
The presence of legal "rackets" would be more readily detected in such
a comprehensive collection of data. They could be dealt with if the
proper bar committee followed the trail directly into the offices
where conditions warranting investigation existed.
Each county could produce periodic reports which would indicate
through statistical curves what was happening in the public relations
field of the bar.
The reports for each state might be collected from the various
counties by the state bar association and should be interesting for
comparative purposes. Similarly, the American Bar Association
might gather from the various states national data of even greater
interest. County, statewide, and national reports would be purely
statistical and anonymous including the type of legal problem in
which the complaint occurred, the nature of the complaint, and the
disposition. Comparative figures from year to year would prove
graphically which problems were increasing and which were dimin-
ishing, whether the battle was being won or lost, whether or not
specific remedial devices were effective. In a word, here would
be the facts on which to base defenses against public criticism, or
platforms for aggressive reforms where needed. 76
The fact gathering agency would add to the present grievance
committee the following elements: accessibility, simplicity adapted to
the capabilities of the most hesitant complainant, and a comprehensive
collection of facts.
7oSee "Beginning of Judicial Statistics," Marshall, STATISTICS IN SOCIAL
STUDIES (1931) 100 for a short discussion of the purposes of such statistics.
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Periodically, the grievance committee, from its survey of the
facts, might recommend to the Bar Association, the court, or the
legislature changes in the rules establishing standards of quality and
character.
THE VALUE OF THE ORGANIZATION
Few proposals for reform are perfect. The only effective pro-
cedure for determining their value is by weighing the advantages
and disadvantages. Objections to the present suggestions will be
based upon the regimentation, expense, apparent novelty, and yet
these may be more than offset by the usefulness of the device in the
present emergency. The legal profession is, and has been the subject
of vigorous attack. The best evidence that the situation is serious
is found, not in the statements of dissatisfaction appearing in the
public press, but in the defensive activities of the profession itself. 7"
If lawyers were not aroused to the significance of the public relations
field of the bar, one would not expect to see them engaged in such
activities as: the increase in the integrated bars, 78 the opposition to
lay encroachments, 79 the American Bar Association program of
leadership in legal reform. 0 Contact with facts rather than with
theories has produced these reactions. The reasonable lawyer should
be greedy for more facts and should welcome the setting up of a
fact gathering device. The emergence of bar surveys of a less
comprehensive and continuous sort s ' than the present proposal in-
dicate that regimentation, expense and novelty are not insurmountable
obstacles.
77Parker, Enforcement of Professional Ethics (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 514;
Armstrong, The Time Has Come for Action (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 526.
78ALA. CODE ANN. (1928) §§ 6220-6239; Ariz. Session Laws 1933, c. 66;
CAL. GEN. LAWS AcT 591; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932); §§ 3-401 to 3-417; Ky.
REV. STAT. (Baldwin, Supp. 1934) § 101-1; La. Acts 2d Ext. Sess. 1934, No.
10, p. 70; MICH. CoM. LAWS (Mason, Supp. 1935) § 13603-1; Miss. LAWS
1932, c. 121; NEV. Comp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 540-590; N. M. CoMp. STAT.(1929) §§ 9-201 to 9-212; N. C. CODE (Michie, Supp. 1933) §§ 215 (1) to 215(18); N. D. CoMP. LAWS (Supp. 1925) §§ 813a1-813a5; Okla. Laws 1929,
c. 264; Ore. Laws 1935, c. 28; S. D. Laws 1931, c. 84; UTAH REV. STAT.
(1933) §§ 6-0-1 to 6-9-23; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1934) §§ 138-1
to 138-17.
79HicKS AND KATZ, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, published by the
A. B. A. 1934.
sSee National Bar Program addresses on a more effective disciplinary
procedure (Aug. 1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 514 and following.
SlLloyd K. Garrison, Results of the Wisconsin Bar Survey (April, 1935);
8 AM. L. SCHOOL REV. 116; Rutledge, A Survey of the Welfare of the Missouri
Bar (April, 1935) 8 A.e. L. SCHOOL REV. 128; Clark, A Proposed National
Survey of the Bar (April, 1935) 8 AM. L. SCHOOL REV. 138.
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
The threatening problem of public control of the professions is
no idle dream. The lack of a clear line of distinction between the
functions of the legislative and judicial branches of government,8 2
the layman's curious mixture of confidence in, and hostility to, any
professional man are not vague ideas. The more keenly a member of
the bar feels the external pressure - legal, social, and economic-
the more likely he is to see value in placing the profession upon a
firmer foundation of public respect which can be attained only by
continuous contact with the facts.
CONCLUSION
Here, then, is a situation and a proposed remedy. The fact
gathering agency is no panacea, but neither is it essentially imprac-
ticable. The use of vital statistics by the medical profession is ac-
cepted as valuable. The use of statistics as to business conditions
by mercantile and commercial organizations is universal. By devising
a similar system to bring it data as to the administration of justice,
the legal profession will protect itself, reassure the public, and pro-
vide a realistic basis for those legal reforms which are necessary to
an ever changing social order.
82Pillsbury, The Power of the Courts to Declare Laws Unconstitutional
(1923) 1 CAL. L. REv. 313; McBain, The Issue: Court or Congress? (Jan. 19,
1936) N. Y. Times.
